Hacker OpSec Failure Leads to Rare Data Recovery

INC Ransomware OpSec Failure Leads to Rare Multi‑Victim Data Recovery

Overview

A major security development this past week revealed an operational security lapse by the INC ransomware gang. This lapse enabled cybersecurity researchers to recover encrypted data stolen from twelve U.S. organizations. Investigations showed that attacker‑controlled cloud storage infrastructure, used repeatedly across multiple campaigns, continued to store exfiltrated data long after ransom events had concluded. This discovery has significant implications for businesses and organizations across the United States assessing their ransomware exposure and incident‑response readiness.

How the Discovery Was Made

The breakthrough occurred during an incident response engagement in which researchers from Cyber Centaurs investigated a RainINC ransomware execution on a production SQL Server. During forensic analysis, investigators uncovered artifacts related to the legitimate backup tool Restic, including renamed binaries, PowerShell scripts and hardcoded repository configuration variables. These findings led researchers to hypothesize that INC operators were reusing shared backup‑style infrastructure across unrelated ransomware campaigns, storing victim data on long‑lived cloud repositories that remained active.

Data Recovery Across Multiple U.S. Sectors

Using non‑destructive enumeration and attacker‑provided configuration parameters, researchers identified snapshots of encrypted data belonging to twelve unrelated victim organizations across healthcare, manufacturing, technology and service industries. The data was decrypted using the same Restic mechanisms attackers relied upon for exfiltration and encryption. Law enforcement was engaged to validate ownership and guide proper handling of the recovered datasets. The affected organizations were not clients of the researchers, underscoring the widespread reuse of attacker infrastructure across incidents.

Implications for U.S. Businesses and Security Leaders

This rare recovery highlights the evolving operational methods of ransomware‑as‑a‑service groups, which increasingly repurpose legitimate backup tools and centralize exfiltrated data in persistent cloud environments. For defenders, the case underscores the importance of monitoring for anomalous backup‑related activity, including unexpected Restic executions or data movement resembling off‑site backup routines. It also reinforces the need to scrutinize cloud storage interactions, patch backup‑software vulnerabilities promptly and enhance detection of renamed binaries and PowerShell‑based automation often used in ransomware staging.

What Organizations Should Do Next

Organizations should update incident response playbooks to include procedures for analyzing attacker infrastructure using non‑intrusive forensics, as the possibility exists that data may remain recoverable long after an attack. Security teams should also deploy detection rules for identifying suspicious Restic use and unusual backup activities, as recommended by investigators. Stronger logging, cloud‑asset monitoring and cross‑team collaboration can improve the chances of identifying attacker infrastructure reuse. This event serves as a reminder that even highly active ransomware groups can make operational mistakes that defenders may be able to exploit.

Webcheck Security can assist your organization with creating or updating incident response playbooks, as well as penetration testing and other cybersecurity consulting services.